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This article looks at the semiofficial cult of the Red (People’s) Guard in Georgia 
from 1917 to 1921. The guard originated in the chaos and uncertainty of late 
1917 and played a key role in securing the power of Noy Zhordania and the social 
democrats in Georgia against Bolshevik and other challenges. It also served as the 
power base for its undisputed leader, Valiko Jugeli. The official and party press 
fostered a heroic cult around the Guard, its exploits, and its leadership, reflected 
in Jugeli’s diary-style memoir, A Heavy Cross (1920). The guard’s cultivated image 
was selfless, politically conscious, internationalist, and devoted to the revolution. 
Its many critics saw it as thuggish, undisciplined, chauvinistic, corrupt, and mili-
tarily ineffective. The mutual dependency between Zhordania and Jugeli ensured 
that the guard was politically untouchable in Georgia. The need to maintain the 
loyalty of the guard, and gain the support of Jugeli, was at times a crucial factor 
in the politics of the country. Ultimately, the power and influence of the guard 
eroded the effectiveness of Georgia’s armed forces, and its treatment of national 
minorities, particularly Armenians and Ossetians, helped Bolsheviks inside and 
outside Georgia undermine and then overthrow the Democratic Republic. After 
the Sovietisation of Georgia in 1921, the record of the guard was used to discred-
it the social democrats’ democratic credentials domestically and internationally. 
Since around 1990, the guards’ South Ossetia campaigns of 1918–1920 have been 
used to underpin the area’s claims for independence from rule by Tbilisi.
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Рассматривается официозный культ Красной (Народной) гвардии в  Гру-
зии с 1917 по 1921 г. Гвардия возникла в хаосе и неопределенности кон-
ца 1917 г. и играла ключевую роль в подкреплении власти Ноя Жордании 
и  грузинских социал-демократов перед лицом большевистских и  других 
угроз. Она служила базой политической власти своего бессменного вожа-
ка Валико Джугели. Официозная партийная пресса создавала героический 
культ гвардии, ее подвигов и ее руководства, который отразился в дневни-
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ках-мемуарах Джугели «Тяжелый крест» (1920). Гвардия предстает в них 
как интернациональная сила, самоотверженная, политически сознатель-
ная и  преданная революции. Однако в  глазах многих она была скорее 
недисциплинированной шовинистической коррумпированной шайкой 
разбойников, причем малоэффективной в военном отношении. Ввиду вза-
имной зависимости Жордании и Джугели гвардия была политически не-
прикосновенной. Необходимость обеспечивать ее лояльность и поддерж-
ку Джугели являлась подчас ключевым фактором в политике республики. 
Однако мощь и влияние гвардии снижали эффективность вооруженных 
сил Грузии, а факты жестокого обращения гвардии с представителями на-
циональных меньшинств, в особенности армян и осетин, помогли боль-
шевикам внутри и вне страны подорвать основы и затем ликвидировать 
демократическую республику. После советизации Грузии в  1921 г. боль-
шевики ссылались на деятельность гвардии для того, чтобы уничтожить 
демократическую репутацию социал-демократов как внутри Грузии, так 
и за ее пределами. В частности, в Южной Осетии начиная с 1990 г. мест-
ные политики используют историю гвардейских кампаний в этом регионе 
в поддержку претензий на независимость от Тбилиси.
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Грузинская Демократическая Республика, Красная (Народная) гвардия, 
«Тяжелый крест», Осетия
On 1/14 December 1917, the Izvestiya of the Tiflis Soviet of Workers’ 
and Soldiers’ Deputies carried a statement from the soviet’s executive com-
mittee, headed ‘Events in Tiflis’ and dated ‘30 November, at 11.00 a. m.’:
Yesterday, on the morning of 29 November, the Executive Committee pre-
sented the arsenal with an order for 2000 rifles for the needs of the Red Guard, 
which is under the command of the committee. The arsenal command refused 
to issue any weapons. The EC then resolved to enforce compliance. To this end, 
on the evening of that same day, it took possession of the arsenal by armed 
force, without a shot being fired. This caused a stir in the Bolshevik units of the 
garrison, and some individuals from the 4th Battalion of the 218th Reserve Reg-
iment made their way to the arsenal one by one in the course of the night. This 
morning, this group of up to 150 people opened fire in a disorderly fashion. 
But this Bolshevik group, acting against the instructions of the EC found no 
support from anyone and was obliged to return to barracks.
There is complete calm in the garrison.
Further updates will be given later 1 [Известия Совета рабочих 
и солдатских депутатов, 1917, 1 дек., с. 1].
One year later, the anniversary of this event (12 December) had become 
a national holiday. The official and social-democratic press was packed with 
celebratory articles and greetings, while Tiflis hosted a massive pageant 
1 All translations from Russian and French into English are by Francis King.
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of People’s Guardsmen 
from across Georgia. 
A raid involving just 
over 200 people to seize 





papers published in 
Georgia and other con-
temporary accounts, 
this article explores the 
official mythologisation 
of the Red (later ‘Peo-
ple’s’) Guard during 
Georgia’s brief period 
of independence from 
Russia, from the end 
of 1917 to early 1921. 
It argues that this he-
roic cult of the guard 
played a key role in the 
ideology and politics 
of the social-democratic regime throughout its existence. Contemporary 
observers noted and remarked upon the political and social importance 
of the guard. The British journalist Carl Bechhofer, the French-Armenian 
diplomat Jean Loris-Mélicof, and the German General Friedrich Frei-
herr Kress von Kressenstein, all highlighted the great influence, material 
privileges and indiscipline of this armed militia, [Bechhofer, p. 58; Lo-
ris-Mélicof, p. 164; Kress von Kressenstein, p. 42] as did numerous Bol-
shevik apologetics for the Red Army’s reannexation of Georgia, published 
in 1921 and after [см., например: Махарадзе; Trotsky]. But apart from 
one brief sour remark by Bechhofer about ‘soul-inspiring’ press coverage 
[Bechhofer, p. 59], there was little attention paid at the time to the cult 
fostered around the guard and its exploits. Subsequent literature in the 
major European languages on this period of Georgian history has gener-
ally focused attention on other aspects of the story, with the exception of 
the memoirs of General Kvintadze, a professional soldier and trenchant 
critic of the guard throughout the independence period [Квинтадзе]. 
Since 1991, the guard has again featured in Russian-language works, 
particularly in relation to its punitive missions in Ossetia. Most recently, 
V. M. Mukhanov has discussed military policy and the relation between 
the guard and the regular army in his detailed history of independent 
Georgia, but without much attention to the guard’s heroic self-presentation 
[Муханов, с. 230–267].
1. G. Lordkipanidze, Minister of War of the Democratic  
Republic of Georgia; N. Zhordania, Head of Govern-
ment; V. Jugeli, Chairman of the General Staff of the 
People's Guard of the Republic. Photograph. 1920
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Background: Georgia after March 1917
Tiflis was the administrative and military centre for all Transcaucasia. 
From 1914 Russia’s war effort against the Ottoman empire was run from 
Tiflis, reserve troops were garrisoned there, 
and troops returning from the southern 
front passed through the city. After the fall 
of Tsarism in March 1917, the key regional 
political figure in Tiflis became Noy Zhor-
dania, the charismatic Menshevik-aligned 
leader of the regional committee of the 
Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party 
(RSDRP) and chair of the Tiflis Soviet of 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.
Years of patient political work and 
struggle had made the RSDRP the predom-
inant political force among intellectuals, 
workers and peasants in Georgia. Most 
Georgian social democrats identified with 
the Mensheviks –  so much so, that in ear-
ly April 1917 the local Bolsheviks opted to 
work with the Mensheviks in united RSDRP organisations, rather than risk 
striking out on their own [Кавказский рабочий, 1917, 2 апр., с. 3].
Among the Armenians, the RSDRP could not dislodge the national-
ist-socialist Dashnaktsutiun, and in the Moslem Tatar (Azeri) population 
it had little influence outside Baku. Nonetheless, the RSDRP’s superior or-
ganisation, dominance in Georgia and presence throughout Transcaucasia 
gave it a hegemonic position in the region after March 1917. The Provisional 
Government in Petrograd replaced the Tsar’s viceroy with a Transcaucasus 
Commission known as OZAKOM, but the real authority in Georgia and 
much of Transcaucasia lay with the Tiflis Soviet, headed by Zhordania. The 
only other city in Transcaucasia with a soviet body of comparable weight 
was Baku, the cosmopolitan capital city of Azerbaijan.
All political institutions across Russia in 1917 were provisional, pending 
the election and convocation of the all-Russia Constituent Assembly, which 
was to decide on the future constitutional structure of the post-revolution 
Russian empire. The Transcaucasian political leaderships all shared this 
perspective. None of them envisaged seceding from Russia, which since the 
revolution held out the prospect of much freer national development with-
in the Russian state. The very real political disagreements between Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan –  not least concerning their national boundaries –  
could be shelved until the Assembly could rule on them.
Although Transcaucasia experienced the same deterioration in political, 
economic and social stability as the rest of Russia during 1917, the Men-
sheviks in Georgia retained their grip on the main political institutions and 
the loyalty of their working-class base. They did not lose many supporters 
2. General G. I. Kvintadze  
(Chikovani). Photograph. 1921
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to the Bolsheviks. Their tacit transformation into an increasingly national 
Georgian political force played an important part here.
October and after
On 25/26 October (7/8 November) 1917, the Bolsheviks overthrew the 
Provisional Government in Petrograd and proclaimed ‘Soviet power’ across 
the empire. They called on soviets everywhere to recognise the ‘Council of 
People’s Commissars’ (Sovnarkom) and its various decrees, including on land 
and peace. There was no ‘October revolution’ in Transcaucasia. Anticipating 
the Sovnarkom’s speedy collapse, the leading politicians of Georgia, Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan all refused to recognise it. Even in Georgia, where the 
socialist movement was predominant, the Bolshevik appeals received little 
response among ethnic-Georgian workers and peasants. However, the largely 
ethnic-Russian soldiers of the southern front and its rear garrisons were far 
more inclined to recognise the Sovnarkom –  a Russian government which 
promised an end to the war, and rapid demobilisation.
October created a power vacuum in Transcaucasia, which several bod-
ies attempted to fill. OZAKOM was replaced on 15/28 November 1917 by 
a Transcaucasian Commissariat  –   a temporary government composed of 
leading figures from the main parties of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
pending the convocation of the All-Russia Constituent Assembly. At the 
same time, ‘national councils’ for Georgia and Armenia were created, which 
sought to play increasingly political roles. But the key institution remained 
the Tiflis Soviet. As the social democrats’ Russian-language paper Bor’ba put 
it on 1/14 December, ‘everyone knows that all power in Tiflis is in the hands 
of the Tiflis Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies’. [Борьба, 1917, 1 дек., 
с.  1]. Paradoxically, the Bolsheviks’ overthrow of the Provisional Govern-
ment had brought about ‘soviet power’ in Tiflis, even though the Tiflis soviet 
leaders and the commissars in Petrograd, refused to recognise one another. 
But ‘power’ needs resources and forces, and so Zhordania’s party looked for 
the means to defend itself and its conception of ‘the revolution’.
The Tiflis Soviet and the regional soviet organisations were the so-
cial democrats’ firmest power base, and the main arena for their struggle 
against the Bolshevik challenge. Bolshevik agitators were particularly active 
among the soldiers. The back pages of the local Bolshevik paper, Kavkazs-
kiy rabochiy, were filled with resolutions from soldiers’ meetings greeting 
the Sovnarkom, denouncing the existing leadership of the Tiflis Soviet, and 
ending with demands like ‘1) arming the groups of soldiers which have no 
arms; 2) immediate new elections for all committees of all soldiers’ units, 
and 3) immediate calling of a congress of delegates of the Caucasus army’, 
or ‘We demand immediate new elections for the Tiflis Soviet of Workers’ 
and Soldiers’ Deputies’ and ‘We demand that power pass into the hands of 
the soviets’ [Кавказский рабочий, 1917, № 200, нояб., с. 4].
Supporters of Lenin’s government across Russia had sought to topple 
non-Bolshevik local leaderships after October, and Tiflis in November 
1917 was on a knife-edge, expecting some kind of vystuplenie. But Zhor-
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dania’s party was not about to surrender power without a fight, particular-
ly since Bolshevik strength in the region was concentrated mainly among 
Russian soldiers keen to be demobilised and leave Transcaucasia for good. 
The Georgian Mensheviks took the initiative. On the pretext that local Bol-
sheviks were planning to seize power under instruction from Petrograd, 
the Executive Committee of the Tiflis Soviet declared a state of martial law 
in Tiflis on 26 November/9 December 1917. [Сеф, с. 336–337]. Тhe next 
day the ‘workers’ Red Guard’ was mobilised to ‘preserve revolutionary or-
der’ in Tiflis and their usual employers were ordered to pay them for the 
time they took off work to accomplish this [Известия Совета рабочих 
и солдатских депутатов, 1917, 30 нояб., с. 1]. But this poorly-armed band 
needed more weapons for this task, and therefore the soviet determined to 
acquire them from the arsenal, voluntarily or otherwise.
Enter Valiko Jugeli
This mission was entrusted to Valiko Jugeli (1887–1924), a young, but 
experienced RSDRP activist and a prominent figure in the Tiflis Soviet. 
In early 1917, when all social democrats were still in the same party, Jugeli 
had identified as a Bolshevik, and wrote leader articles for Kavkazskiy rab-
ochiy [Кавказский рабочий, 1917, 30 марта, с. 1]. But by the end of May 
he had alienated other local Bolshevik leaders and was denounced over 
two issues of the same paper as ‘a little man with a big opinion of himself ’. 
[Кавказский рабочий, 1917, 30 мая, с. 2, 3; 31 мая, с. 2, 3]. He had subse-
quently transferred his loyalty to Noy Zhordania and the leadership of the 
Tiflis Soviet, even though he would still sometimes claim to be a Bolshe-
vik. [Джугели, с. XII]. Impetuous, daring and charismatic, Jugeli was the 
natural leader of the Red Guard, able to command the loyalty of his men. 
He knew his organisation was one of the lynchpins of social-democratic 
power in a period of political, administrative and military chaos. It was the 
only reliable force at Zhordania’s disposal, and this underpinned Jugeli’s 
rapid rise to become one of the most powerful figures in Georgia, if not, 
for a time, in Transcaucasia.
Political authority in Transcaucasia was completely chaotic at this time. 
There was a ‘government’, the Transcaucasian Commissariat, which had al-
most no apparatus, armed forces or budget. It claimed still to be part of 
Russia, but did not recognise the government in Petrograd, nor any other 
government in Russia. There was a fragile ceasefire on the Ottoman front, 
still manned by remnants of the Russian army, but neither the Bolshevik-in-
fluenced soldiers nor those outside their group recognised any authority 
in Tiflis. The National Councils were trying to organise locally-recruited 
armies to take the place of the departing Russian forces, but with neither 
resources nor discipline these ‘national’ units were a poor substitute for the 
Russian army, and frequently degenerated into groups of bandits. Without 
the Red Guard, loyal to the soviet and its leaders, and led by the reliable and 
capable Jugeli, Zhordania’s party might have been swept away. Moreover, 
as it was a volunteer force, comprised of workers whose employers had 
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to keep paying their wages while the guards were mobilised, the soviet did 
not need to pay for its upkeep [Известия Совета рабочих и солдатских 
депутатов, 1917, 30 нояб., с. 1].
Early Red Guard campaigns
In late 1917 and early 1918, the Red Guard was mainly concerned with 
internal security. The initial threats came from groups of Russian soldiers 
in Tiflis, some seeking to overthrow the local authorities in favour of the 
Sovnarkom, others simply looking for a chance to loot. As Jugeli put it, 
in a speech to mark the first anniversary of the seizure of the arsenal
Taking the arsenal protected Tiflis from Bolshevised bands, from disorgan-
ised soldiers who were on their way home and fancied stopping off in Tiflis to 
poke about a bit there. After the armed action of the Tiflis proletariat, they no 
longer wanted to make a detour to Tiflis, because they knew that there they 
would meet armed resistance from the workers [Джугели, с. XVI].
But even if the soldiers could be deterred from marauding in Geor-
gia’s cities on their way back from the southern front, how were they to 
get back to Russia? How much weaponry and equipment should they 
take with them –  and who was to take charge of the weaponry left be-
hind? The rail route back to Russia passed through Georgia, and then 
Azerbaijan. The slow-moving trains on the unguarded railway were 
a sitting target for Tatar (Azeri) armed bands seeking more weapons. 
In one notorious incident, the ‘Shamkhor massacre’ of 9/22 January 
1918, a train full of soldiers returning to Russia, already largely disarmed 
by Georgian national military forces, was then attacked and massacred 
in Azerbaijan by Tatar forces aiming to seize their remaining arms 
[ИККЦ, 1918, 12 янв., с. 3]. This caused an immediate scandal in Geor-
gia. At a session of the soviet Regional Centre, Jugeli denounced both 
the massacre and the preceding ‘looting’ of the soldiers by the Georgian 
national forces. To Jugeli, the ‘national’ military forces were both a rival 
to the Red Guard and a hotbed of nationalism and counterrevolution 
[ИККЦ, 1918, 14 янв., с.  3]. The Red Guard’s ‘militia’ model, in con-
trast, provided a ‘reliable guarantee that the question of armed forces 
for Transcaucasia will be resolved in full accord with the demands and 
interests of democracy’ [Там же, с. 2]. A fortnight later, at the Regional 
Centre, Jugeli clashed with his party comrade, Noy Ramishvili, who ar-
gued for nationally-based armed forces within Transcaucasia. [ИККЦ, 
1918, 28 янв., с. 3]. Jugeli positioned himself and the guard as defenders 
of the gains of the revolution, rather than defenders of the nation.
Army or guard?
On 8/21 February the soviet paper published an article, ‘Red Guard’, 
with the byline ‘He’ –  almost certainly Jugeli –  which declared:
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The creation of the National Councils and their regiments, which have 
already started out along the road of defending narrowly-national interests, 
the departure homewards of the frontline Russian forces, the growing anar-
chy, the lack of any firm power –  all this, taken together, is evidently a threat 
to the revolution and its gains.
The presence of this threat made it essential to organise the Red Guard 
quickly [ИККЦ, 1918, 8 февр., с. 2].
It called for both military and political education for the Red Guard, the 
better to defend the revolution. This notion that national armies were a 
source of counterrevolution would have a profound effect on Georgia’s sub-
sequent fate.
At this stage, however, the Red Guard was more a militia than an army, 
mainly concerned with quashing local disorders and rooting out bandits. 
Its mettle was tested on 10/23 February 1918, when the Sejm –  a new par-
liament for Transcaucasia, based on the deputies elected from the region 
to the all-Russia Constituent Assembly –   opened in Tiflis. The local Bol-
sheviks called a mass rally in the Alexander Gardens in Tiflis, in front of 
the Sejm, to protest this ‘counterrevolutionary’ move. Convinced that local 
Bolshevik leaders Stepan Shaumyan and Nikolay Kuznetsov were going to 
use this rally to storm the Sejm and declare ‘soviet power’, the Tiflis Soviet 
allowed the Red Guard to help disperse the rally. Armed clashes left one po-
liceman and seven demonstrators dead. [ИККЦ, 1918, 14 февр., с. 4]. The 
soviet appointed a commission to investigate the events, but, as Zhordania 
later admitted, ‘we knew in advance that its findings would be kept quiet’. 
[Жордания, с. 84].
As the Red Guard expanded its operations and became more firmly 
entrenched, at least in Georgia and on its periphery, its mythology devel-
oped. In early March 1918 it held a major rally outside the Sejm in Tiflis, 
with speeches from regional social-democratic leaders, including Nikolay 
Chkeidze, Isidor Ramishvili, Evgeniy Gegechkori and Vladimir Voytinsky, 
as well as Jugeli, who concluded:
Our Red Guard is an international force. We do not recognise divisions into 
Muslims, Armenians, Russians and Georgians. For us there is just one revolu-
tionary proletariat … This international is not limited to Tiflis. It spreads across 
Transcaucasia, across Russia, across the whole world. Long live the internation-
al Red Guard! [ИККЦ, 1918, 2 марта, с. 4].
In mid-March, official regulations for the guard were issued. Its pur-
pose was defined as ‘defence of the revolution and decisive struggle against 
counter-revolution and anarchy’; it admitted ‘all workers who have a class 
and internationalist standpoint’, with ‘strict filtration’ to exclude unsuitable 
elements. Red Guards were ‘obliged to observe the strictest revolutionary 
discipline’, any violations of which were ‘a crime against the revolution’. 
Point 9 obliged Red Guards to ‘present an example of high revolutionary 
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morality and, struggling decisively against all antirevolutionary and anti-
socialist phenomena around them, above all fight mercilessly against all 
such phenomena in their own midst’. [ИККЦ, 1918, 13 марта, с. 4]. Such 
ideals probably had a greater effect on the guards’ self-image than on their 
behaviour.
In the latter part of March 1918 the Red Guard was despatched to sup-
press disorders in and around Tskhinvali, South Ossetia. It was reported 
that the first group of guards sent there was overwhelmed and disarmed 
by ‘an armed band of Ossetians and Georgians, composed entirely of for-
mer soldiers’, characterised as ‘Bolshevik elements, hooligan elements and 
landowner elements’. [ИККЦ, 1918, 23 марта, с. 3, 4]. Several guards were 
killed or taken prisoner, and in response a large mixed force of Red Guards, 
regular troops, gunners and machine gunners was sent to crush the re-
bellion with ‘unwavering decisiveness’. At the same time, Jugeli called for 
‘the greatest care and tact, in order not to deepen the terrible gulf which 
this provocation has opened up between us and the unenlightened local 
masses’. [ИККЦ, 1918, 24 марта, с. 3]. The gulf would prove hard to close.
Quashing internal disorder within Georgia was one matter, but war 
against a traditional, well-funded army was another. The shaky ceasefire 
on the southern front with the Ottoman empire was crumbling in April 
1918, and although Armenia was getting the worst of the Turkish advances, 
Georgia was also threatened. Early that month, Jugeli addressed the Sejm 
to a standing ovation with calls of ‘Long live the Red Guard!’, although his 
rousing speech denouncing Turcophilia said little about how best to resist 
the Ottoman forces. [ИККЦ, 1918, 4 апр., с.  4]. In fact, the main resis-
tance came from the regular troops of the Transcaucasian Commissariat, 
organised into national formations with the Armenians taking on the brunt 
of the fighting [Квинтадзе, с. 32].
The relentless Ottoman advance of spring 1918 drove the very rap-
id changes which took place in Transcaucasia in April and May 1918. 
On 9/22 April 1918, on Turkish insistence, Transcaucasia finally declared 
itself a sovereign state, independent from Russia and competent to negoti-
ate with Turkey. Five weeks later, also as a result of Turkish pressure, Geor-
gia broke from its neighbours, declared ‘independence’ on 26 May 1918, 
and immediately invited in German troops for protection against Turkish 
encroachments. Independent Georgia’s new government was led at first 
by the veteran social democrat Noy Ramishvili, while Zhordania remained 
in his own power base of the regional soviet centre. On 4 June, Ramishvili 
signed a peace treaty with Turkey, ceding significant territory, including 
control of the important port of Batum.
The Red Guard leadership protested vigorously against this treaty, pro-
posing a motion at the regional soviet centre on 5 June that
…such a treaty should not have been signed without one final, desperate 
attempt at armed resistance. We should have fought. … It would have been 
better to perish, than to give in to the enemy without one last attempt to resist. 
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It would have cost us our heads, but the enemy would not have bought victory 
over us so cheaply, and would have taken our country more seriously in the 
future [Борьба, 1918, 8 июня, с. 2].
The motion was lost by a margin of just two votes. It was notable that 
Bor’ba, the Russian-language paper of the ruling Georgian social demo-
crats, clearly sympathised with this criticism of Ramishvili. The paper 
had long championed the Red Guards, and did much to foster the cult 
of the organisation. The issue of 15 June, for example, devoted half a page to 
the memory of Valiko Sherashidze, one of Jugeli’s closest comrades, killed 
in action on an operation against Azeri (Tatar) fighters in Borchalo district, 
in the south. Almost in passing, the article stated:
The news of the death of our beloved comrade and leader led to grief, and 
anger, and a call for vengeance.
The village, in which Sherashidze was killed, was razed to the ground… 
[Борьба, 1918, 15 июня, с. 2].
Despite Jugeli’s call in April for ‘care and tact’ in dealing with rebellious 
areas, the destruction of settlements where armed resistance was encoun-
tered would increasingly become a standard practice.
Red Guard to People’s Guard
Building an independent nation state in Georgia after May 1918, albeit 
initially under German tutelage, required a single set of state institutions, 
including armed forces. The Tiflis and regional soviet centres no longer 
needed to exercise state functions. But the soviet’s Red Guard had become 
an important political force, and the social democrat leaders, not least 
Noy Zhordania, wanted to keep an armed body that served as a guarantor 
of ‘the revolution’ and as a political counterweight to the regular army. 
After all, most of Georgia’s professional army officers were not friends 
of social democracy.
The transformation of the Red Guard had certain aspects of a coup d’état. 
On 8 June, the regional soviet centre resolved to ‘renounce all “functions 
of a state character” and hand over its armed forces to the government’. 
[Социал-демократ, 1918, 17 июня, с. 1]. Jugeli, in turn, protested, declar-
ing that
he would agree to such a diminution of the rights of the Executive Commit-
tee on condition that N. N. Zhordania (chair of the EC of the Soviet of Workers’ 
Deputies) became head of the government, because only in that case would 
it be possible to trust the government fully [Там же, с. 1].
In other words, the Red Guard would only submit to a government which 
was to its taste. Jugeli’s condition could not be met immediately. The views 
of the German occupying forces, and the Georgian generals tasked with 
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building the regular army, needed to be considered. [Квинтадзе, с. 46–47]. 
In mid-June, the social democrat members of the Georgian National Coun-
cil proposed a law, which ‘declared the existing Red Guard to be the People’s 
Guard of the Democratic Republic of Georgia’. [Квинтадзе, с. 48–49]. All 
its structures and personnel were to be transferred unchanged. Writing in 
Bor’ba, Vladimir Voytinsky stressed:
It is important that state recognition should not suck the vital spirit out of 
our Red Guard, and that the Red Guard, having become a state body, should 
remain the same as it was beforehand –  a fraternal league of people loyal to the 
revolution, who have taken up arms to defend ideals dear and sacred to them 
[Борьба, 1918, 15 июня, с. 2].
The draft law entrenched the civilian character of the People’s Guard. 
Unlike the regular army, the guard would not be answerable to the Min-
ister of War but directly to the head of government. ‘In short,’ Voytin-
sky summed up, ‘it affirms the People’s Guard’s role as a revolutionary 
civilian militia’ [Там же].
This scheme met with some serious criticism. General Kvintadze, as-
sistant to the Minister of War in June 1918 and one of the most compe-
tent professional army officers in Georgia, sought to amend it so that 
the regular army took precedence in terms of call-up and mobilisation, 
but he was also against the entire concept of the People’s Guard, arguing 
that ‘as an armed force, it was completely unfit for purpose on the battle-
field’. [Квинтадзе, с. 51]. His outspokenness on this matter earned him 
a sharp rebuke from Noy Zhordania and immediate dismissal from the 
ministry. [Квинтадзе, с. 51].
In the National Council debate on the People’s Guard, Jugeli, with his 
characteristic frankness, argued for retaining the guard because ‘the hand 
of reaction’ might ‘turn the regular army to its side’ and, therefore, ‘democ-
racy should have its own, more reliable military apparatus’. [Борьба, 1918, 
23 июня, с. 3]. The representatives of the liberal-nationalist National Demo-
crats in the National Council seized on this distinction. V. Tsereteli (not to be 
confused with the social democrat Iraklii Tsereteli), did not mince his words:
The Red Guard is neither chosen by the people nor responsible to it. 
It is a party organisation, a state within a state. Troops which are separate from 
the people are a dangerous thing. It consists of socialists. Jugeli openly said, that 
the Red Guard is needed to take action against the regular army. This is the start 
of civil war. The people does not love the Red Guard; it detests it. All the time 
we have this Red Guard, there will be no end to the chaos [Там же].
V. Tsereteli put the National Democrats’ case that ‘we need to create 
regular armed forces and abolish the Red Guard’. [Кавказ, 1918, 26 июня, 
с. 2]. However, his party was a small minority in the council, and the so-
cial democrats had no difficulty in getting the People’s Guard approved. 
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The ‘coup’ was completed on 24 June, when Iraklii Tsereteli addressed the 
National Council on behalf of the social democrats proposing the cre-
ation of a ‘strong government, around which all the democratic forces can 
unite … The person who enjoys the trust of the majority is N. N. Zhor-
dania, who should be at the head of the new government’. [Там же, с. 2]. 
Jugeli was jubilant at the news:
My dream has come true: N. N. Zhordania has become head of the govern-
ment. He has brought certain members of the bureau of the [soviet] Executive 
Committee into his government. This is good: I can serve such a government 
without question… They have offered me the post of deputy war minister. But I 
refused categorically, I don’t want to lose the guard, or the guard to lose me… 
[Джугели, с. 27].
The cult develops
The newly-renamed People’s Guard continued to enjoy extensive and 
sympathetic coverage in Bor’ba and the official press, and could now also 
mobilise state resources to boost its profile. The first anniversary of the 
seizure of the arsenal was marked in style. On 6 December 1918, the 
front page editorial in Bor’ba recounted the heroic seizure of the arsenal. 
It described how ‘250 Tiflis workers took over the arsenal against a 20 
thousand strong “Bolshevistically” inclined garrison’ because they ‘ex-
pressed the united will of the organised proletariat of Georgia’. Moreover, 
this united will ‘has been expressed in all the subsequent heroic struggle 
of the People’s Guard’. [Борьба, 1918, 6 дек., с. 1]. The issue of 11 Decem-
ber carried details of the ‘heroes’ trains’, bringing guards in from all over 
the country for their grand parade in the centre of Tiflis. [Борьба, 1918, 
11 дек., с.  4]. Finally, on the anniversary itself (12 December), much 
of the paper was devoted to panegyrics to the People’s Guard, reprints 
of speeches that Zhordania and Jugeli had given at the time the arsenal 
was seized, poems extolling the guard, and suchlike. Vladimir Voytinsky 
lauded the multi-ethnic composition of the guard, the fact that devotion 
to the revolution was the only criterion for membership, and that ‘it has 
always been and remains the most reliable keeper of the ideals of interna-
tionalism’ [Борьба, 1918, 12 дек., с. 2].
This anniversary issue of Bor’ba also carried the first instalment 
of ‘A Heavy Cross’ (Тяжелый крест)  –   Jugeli’s frank and unvarnished 
memoir of the campaigns of the guard, written in the form of a diary. Fur-
ther instalments of this memoir became an irregular feature in the paper, 
often on special occasions, and in 1920 these extracts were republished as 
a book –  a work which secured Jugeli’s reputation.
Sotsial-demokrat, the paper of the ‘internationalists’ who rejected 
the Georgian social democrats’ breakaway from Russia and the RSDRP, 
took a sourer view of the People’s Guard and its anniversary festivities:
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Red flags, troop movements, artillery on the streets of Tiflis, processions, 
welcome speeches, triumphant spectacles, a military band, the cheery sound of 
the zurna being played –  there was all of this on 12 December, the day of the 
People’s Guard.
There was all of this, but one thing was missing –  a festive atmosphere…
It is enough to compare the festival of 12 December with the solemn 
tribute to the memory of the fallen in the revolution which took place in 
Tiflis on 23 March last year to see how far removed today’s celebrations 
are from the ceremony of all the people of last year… [Социал-демократ, 
1918, 16 дек., с. 4].
General Kvintadze, meanwhile, was exasperated that such celebra-
tions were taking place at all while there was a war going on. Clashes 
with Armenian armed bands over border areas had been flaring up since 
the first week of December 1918, but the People’s Guard in Tiflis was 
more concerned with organising its festivities, even bringing its caval-
ry away from the battle zone at Ekaterinenfeld to take part in the parade 
[Квинтадзе, с. 59].
A test of ‘internationalism’ –  war with Armenia
The skirmishes on the border with Armenia on the Borchalo River 
rapidly turned into a war between the two states. On 14 December 1918, 
around the start of hostilities, Jugeli noted in his diary that ‘the enemies 
of democracy and socialism can easily give the Borchalo difficulties 
a nationalist character’. [Джугели, с. 88]. Sure enough, by 31 December, 
Jugeli was fretting that the ceasefire due to come into effect at midnight 
might prevent his forces from taking the village of Bolnis, as ‘the vital 
interests of our country demand this! <…> We must bring our country 
a splendid new year’s present!’ [Там же, с. 108–109]. It was not just on 
the border that nationalism flourished. Georgia’s Armenian population 
became the enemy within, to be arrested, expropriated, looted or ex-
pelled at will. So indiscriminate was the campaign that on 25 Decem-
ber Arshak Zurabov, an old social democrat of Armenian ethnicity was 
given a special pass to certify that ‘he, as an Armenian, is not liable to 
detention or arrest’. [НАГ. Ф. 1832. Оп. 1. Д. 1. Л. 1]. For his part, Zu-
rabov expressed his feelings in a very bitter open letter to Zhordania. 
[Социал-демократ, 1919, 13 янв., с.  1–2]. A letter in the next issue 
of Sotsial-demokrat signed ‘Arrestee’ told the story of a group of Arme-
nians, arrested at a railway station near Gori on 23 December by the 
local People’s Guard on account of their nationality. They were held for 
20 days in appalling conditions, before being handed charge sheets, filled 
out with bogus charges. [Социал-демократ, 1919, 20 янв., с. 4]. Jugeli’s 
own assessment of the war was altogether more benign: ‘we fought this 
war not against the Armenian people, but just against monstrous Arme-
nian nationalism…’ [Джугели, с. 110–111].
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Jugeli’s “Heavy Cross”
This series of diary-style vignettes, first published in Bor’ba, constitute 
the main text of the People’s Guard cult. They appeared some months after 
the events they described, were written for public consumption, but are 
still quite revealing. The title reflects Jugeli’s self-presentation as a reluctant 
warrior motivated by an overriding sense of duty. He was clearly a very 
emotional man, sincerely devoted to Zhordania and a certain conception 
of revolution. He could be calculating –  on 13 July 1919 he demonstratively 
resigned from the People’s Guard in protest against a repeat move by the 
social-democratic group in the Constituent Assembly to subordinate the 
guard to the War Ministry rather than to the head of government. This paid 
off, in that by 19 July he could announce that ‘my “incident” with the frac-
tion is exhausted, our amendment has been accepted… we are once again 
independent from the generals, and once again free in our democratism!’ 
[Джугели, с. 165].
The section of Heavy Cross which earned the book and its author last-
ing notoriety concerned the ‘South Ossetian Vendée’ of June 1920. South 
Ossetia had been restive throughout the DRG’s existence, and, encouraged 
by local Bolsheviks, there was a large-scale rising there from May 1920. 
Jugeli’s forces joined the effort to repress the rebellion, which he blamed on 
‘Ossetian nationalists –  our worst and tireless enemies’ [Там же, с. 231]. On 
12 June he noted that ‘among the guards there is serious annoyance… and 
therefore several houses have already been set on fire. It’s night now. You 
can see fires everywhere! But I’m used to it now and can look at it almost 
calmly’ [Там же, с. 235]. The next day he expressed his contempt:
The Ossetians, those silent slaves of the old autocracy, those faithful lackeys 
of our landowners and old police-officers, those born watchmen –   now they 
are donning red mantles and posing as revolutionaries. <…>  We love freedom, 
our democracy and our republic. We are fighting for the liberation of the work-
ing class. And in the interests of the struggling working class, in the interests of 
the socialism of the future we shall be harsh! [Там же].
A view from the army
General Kvintadze was commanding army operations alongside the 
People’s Guard in the South Ossetian campaign, and observed the guards’ 
uncontrolled rampaging and killing sprees. Kvintadze remarked in his 
own memoirs:
I cannot understand… how anyone can imagine that an organisation like 
the Guard, with such appalling practices and morals can be a threat to the en-
emy or useful to the motherland. <…> They were scared to touch the Guard. 
It dominated the state. The Guard was the institution which held the real power 
in the state [Квинтадзе, с. 205].
Problema voluminis88
More than once Kvintadze was brought into the top military command 
in times of dire military crisis, and then dismissed again once the crisis was 
over because of his hostility to social democracy and the People’s Guard. 
Four days after the Red Army invaded Georgia, on 15 February 1921, Kvin-
tadze was again summoned to help direct the war effort, although by this 
time he realised that the war was already lost. His view of the military use-
fulness of the People’s Guard was scathing:
They were Praetorians. They filled the same position under our rulers as the 
Praetorians did under the Roman emperors. They were just as privileged, and 
it was as necessary to take account of them and bow to their demands, as it was 
with the Praetorians [Квинтадзе, с. 368].
The cult of the People’s Guard in history
Just as the Bolshevik invasion was putting an end to the DRG, Voytin-
sky published La Démocratie Géorgienne in Paris, aimed at a French labour 
movement audience. A short section on the People’s Guard carried a glow-
ing portrait of Jugeli:
Young, handsome, energetic, an excellent speaker… calm and cautious when 
he prepares an operation, imperturbable and courageous in combat, always lead-
ing the assault… [his] word is law for the guardsmen… [Woytinsky, p. 103].
But it was too late to export the cult of the People’s Guard. With the 
successful Red Army takeover of Georgia, the bitter recriminations among 
the Georgian exiles, including General Kvintadze’s damning assessment 
of the usefulness of the guard militarily and its organisational principles, 
the assiduously fostered cult came to nought. Jugeli’s arrest by the Che-
ka in August 1924, while on a clandestine mission to organise a national 
anti-Bolshevik rising in Georgia, the cunning way Lavrenti Beria subse-
quently sought to use him to forestall the rebellion, and his eventual execu-
tion on 30 August, all represented a sad end to a remarkable career [Лурье, 
Маляров, с. 91–104].
However, Jugeli’s Heavy Cross ensured that he was not forgotten. Its in-
cautiously frank descriptions of People’s Guard operations, especially the 
suppression of the rebellion in South Ossetia in 1920, were seized on by 
Bolshevik publicists to besmirch the ‘democratic’ credentials of the DRG. 
In Between Red and White, Trotsky damned Jugeli as a ‘repulsive mounte-
bank’ [Trotsky, p. 69], while the Georgian Bolshevik leader Filipp Makha-
radze, in The Menshevik Dictatorship in Georgia, characterised the guards 
as not merely Praetorians, but ‘oprichniki’ [Махарадзе, с. 103]. Since 1991, 
the break-up of the USSR and the ethnic conflicts on the territory of the 
former Georgian SSR, Heavy Cross has been much used in support of South 
Ossetia’s claim for independence from Georgia. In 2016, a South Ossetian 
propaganda film Iron Vendée selectively quoted Jugeli’s book to present him 
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as nothing more than a malevolent, sadistic villain [Iron Vendée]. Cults and 
mythologies have a life of their own, and their evolution may sometimes 
surprise their creators.
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